NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP 14 JULY 1981

PAKISTAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Offic	NFAC 4311-81 13 July 1981	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Chairman, National Intelligence Council	
FROM:	Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA	25 X 1
SUBJECT:	NSPG -NSC Meeting Topic: Pakistan (14 July 1981)	25 X 1
Security Assist forthcoming IG should prepare assistance issu (if indeed they	June 1981, Mr. Allen circulated the memorandum on Pakistan ance located at Tab A. This memorandum indicated two meetings one chaired by Defense and the other by State papers dealing with USG approaches to the security e. NIO/NESA did not participate in either of these IGs were held) [and we have received no papers which may	
have been prepa	red as their result. Thus, we are at sea without an oar comorrow's specific proposals which may come before the NSC.	25X1
2. A brie is located at T	reprise of Pakistani external and internal security concerns ab B. This provides some background. I have also included ary on the subject written by of OPA.	ILLEGIB 25X1
on the Soviet T be coordinating contingency pla which has been	tary Haig has recently requested that we prepare an SNIE Threat to Pakistan. Acting NIO for the USSR, will a the draft. Presently OSR has a draft assessment of Soviet anning for operations along Pakistan's Northwest frontier in the works for several weeks. A copy of the principal located at Tab C.	25X1 25X1
4. In Feb titled <u>Reaction</u> Pakistan relati	oruary 1980, the Intelligence Community published an SNIE as to US Military Assistance to Pakistan. I believe that US- ions are much better now than when this estimate was written. I it largely because the judgments regarding Pakistani options	20/(1
		25 X 1
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ab D.	internal situation. Both o	t these are 25%
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